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Abstract
The design of computationally efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms that solve or approx-
imate fundamental resource allocation problems is the main goal of algorithmic mechanism design. A
central example in both theory and practice is welfare-maximization in combinatorial auctions. Recently,
a randomized mechanism has been discovered for combinatorial auctions that is truthful in expectation
and guarantees a (1− 1/e)-approximation to the optimal social welfare when players have coverage val-
uations [11]. This approximation ratio is the best possible even for non-truthful algorithms, assuming
P 6= NP [16].
Given the recent sequence of negative results for combinatorial auctions under more restrictive notions
of incentive compatibility [7, 2, 9], this development raises a natural question: Are truthful-in-expectation
mechanisms compatible with polynomial-time approximation in a way that deterministic or universally
truthful mechanisms are not? In particular, can polynomial-time truthful-in-expectation mechanisms
guarantee a near-optimal approximation ratio for more general variants of combinatorial auctions?
We prove that this is not the case. Specifically, the result of [11] cannot be extended to combinatorial
auctions with submodular valuations in the value oracle model. (Absent strategic considerations, a
(1− 1/e)-approximation is still achievable in this setting [24].) More precisely, we prove that there is a
constant γ > 0 such that there is no randomized mechanism that is truthful-in-expectation— or even
approximately truthful-in-expectation — and guarantees an m−γ-approximation to the optimal social
welfare for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations in the value oracle model.
We also prove an analogous result for the flexible combinatorial public projects (CPP) problem, where
a truthful-in-expectation (1 − 1/e)-approximation for coverage valuations has been recently developed
[13]. We show that there is no truthful-in-expectation — or even approximately truthful-in-expectation
— mechanism that achieves an m−γ-approximation to the optimal social welfare for combinatorial public
projects with submodular valuations in the value oracle model. Both our results present an unexpected
separation between coverage functions and submodular functions, which does not occur for these problems
without strategic considerations.
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1 Introduction
The design of incentive-compatible mechanisms for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions is a
central problem of algorithmic mechanism design. In a combinatorial auction, there are n players and a set
M of m items. Player i has a (private) valuation function vi : 2
M → R+ which is assumed to be monotone
(vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) whenever S ⊂ T ) and normalized (vi(∅) = 0). The goal is to design a computationally efficient
mechanism that yields an allocation of items (S1, . . . , Sn) to the players along with payments (p1, . . . , pn)
so that (a) the social welfare
∑n
i=1 vi(Si) is approximately maximized, and (b) the mechanism is incentive-
compatible, or truthful, meaning that each player maximizes his utility vi(Si) − pi by reporting his true
valuation vi.
This problem has been studied extensively in both strategic and non-strategic settings. Various strate-
gic solution concepts have been considered, including deterministic truthfulness, universal truthfulness, and
truthfulness in expectation. Moreover, both strategic and non-strategic formulations of the problem have
been studied for various restricted classes of valuations, as well as under various assumptions on how valua-
tions are accessed or represented. Absent assumptions on the class of valuations, the welfare maximization
problem is very hard to approximate even by non-truthful algorithms (NP-hardness ofmǫ−1/2-approximation
follows from the set packing problem). Better approximation ratios are possible for valuation classes that
restrict complementarity between items. The most prominent such class of valuations is submodular func-
tions : functions vi where the marginal value vi(S ∪ {j}) − vi(S) for a each fixed item j is non-increasing
in S. It is known that the welfare maximization problem with submodular valuation functions admits a
(non-truthful) (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm [24], and this is optimal assuming P 6= NP [16]. The
hardness result of [16] holds even in the special case of coverage valuations; the algorithmic result of [24]
holds in the value oracle model, where each vi can be queried only through an oracle returning vi(S) for a
given query S. In the value oracle model, it is known that any (1− 1/e+ ǫ)-approximation for combinatorial
auctions with submodular valuations would require an exponential number of queries [20]. This is also the
model we consider in this paper.
The classical VCG mechanism is incentive compatible and maximizes welfare in combinatorial auctions.
Unfortunately, however, VCG can not be implemented in polynomial time even for very special classes of
valuation functions, including submodular functions. Combining computational efficiency and truthfulness
for combinatorial auctions appears difficult. A series of works have provided evidence that computational
efficiency and truthfulness are in conflict: (deterministic) VCG-type mechanisms have been ruled out for
submodular combinatorial auctions in the communication complexity model [7], and even for explicitly given
budget-additive valuations [2]. Recently, Dobzinski [9] proved that there is no deterministic truthful or even
randomized universally truthful mechanism for submodular combinatorial auctions in the value oracle model,
achieving an approximation ratio better than mǫ−1/2.
Therefore, it came as a surprise when a (1 − 1/e)-approximate randomized mechanism was discovered
by Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan [11] for a large subclass of submodular valuations. Their mechanism is
truthful in expectation — a weaker notion than truthfulness in the universal sense — and applies to explicitly
represented coverage functions. More generally, their mechanism applies to “black-box” valuations that are
expressible as weighted sums of matroid rank functions, provided they support “lottery-value queries” (what
is the expected value E[vi(x̂)] for a given product distribution x̂). The mechanism can be also implemented in
the value oracle model, at the cost of relaxing the solution concept to approximate truthfulness in expectation
[12].
This development raises a natural question: Could truthfulness-in-expectation be the cure for combina-
torial auctions, perhaps providing an optimal (1− 1/e)-approximation for all submodular valuations? Given
that a (1 − 1/e)-approximation for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions (without truthfulness)
was also discovered first for coverage functions [8], then for weighted sums of matroid rank functions [4]
and later extended to monotone submodular functions [24], it seems reasonable to conjecture that the same
might happen for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms.
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Our results. We prove that this is not the case, and there is a significant separation between the class
of coverage functions and general monotone submodular functions. More precisely, there is no truthful-in-
expectation mechanism (even (1 − ǫ)-approximately truthful-in-expectation) for submodular combinatorial
auctions in the value oracle model, guaranteeing an approximation better than 1/mγ for some fixed ǫ, γ > 0
(Theorem 5.1). In particular, the results of [11] cannot be extended to all monotone submodular functions.
We also prove a similar result for the flexible submodular combinatorial public projects problem (see
Section 4 for a history of this problem): there is no (1− ǫ)-approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism
providing approximation better than 1/mγ for some γ > 0. This is true even in the case of a single player.
The combinatorial public projects problem admits a simpler structure than combinatorial auctions, and
hence we use it as a warm-up to demonstrate our approach.
Class of valuations Approximation Universally truthful Truthful-in-expectation
submodular / value oracle 1− 1/e m−1/2 | mǫ−1/2 m−1/2 | m−γ [new]
coverage, matroid rank sums 1− 1/e m−1/2 | 1− 1/e 1− 1/e
budget-additive 34 | 1516 m−1/2 | 1516 m−1/2 | 1516
submodular / demand oracle 1− 1/e+ ǫ | 1516 Ω(1/ logm log logm) | 1516 Ω(1/ logm log logm) | 1516
Figure 1: Currently known results for combinatorial auctions: approximation | inapproximability. If only one result is
given, it is known to be optimal. For randomized maximal-in-range (universally truthful) mechanisms, it is known that
it is hard to achieve a better than 1/n-approximation for coverage valuations; however, other universally truthful
mechanisms might exist. No non-trivial hardness was previously known for truthful-in-expectation combinatorial
auctions, even when restricted to maximal-in-distributional-range mechanisms.
Our techniques. Our hardness results are obtained by combining two recently developed techniques: the
symmetry gap technique for submodular functions [25], and the direct hardness approach for combinatorial
auctions [9].
First, we consider the possibility of maximal-in-distributional range (MIDR) mechanisms. We endeavor
to explain why the approach of [11] breaks down when applied to monotone submodular functions. The
answer lies in a certain convexity phenomenon that can be exploited in a symmetry gap argument. The
symmetry gap argument on its own rules out the approach of [11]. Furthermore, it is possible to generalize
the argument to an arbitrary MIDR mechanism, and moreover amplify the gap to some constant power of
m. In fact our approach rules out even non-uniform approximately-MIDR mechanisms.
In the case of combinatorial public projects (CPP), we prove that if non-uniformity is allowed, then
approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanisms are no more powerful — in terms of approximating com-
binatorial auctions using a polynomial number of value queries — than MIDR mechanisms. Therefore, by
ruling out MIDR mechanisms, we also rule out truthful-in-expectation mechanisms. In the case of combi-
natorial auctions, no such equivalence in power between truthful-in-expectation and MIDR mechanisms is
known. Instead, we apply the direct hardness approach of Dobzinski [9] to identify a single player for whom
the allocation problem in some sense mimics the CPP problem. Again, the symmetry gap argument can
be used here, though payments complicate the picture. We address this difficulty by employing a scaling
argument and invoking the separating hyperplane theorem — this allows us to essentially get rid of the
payments and use the same gap amplification technique we used for the CPP problem to obtain a hardness
of m−γ-approximation.
Organization of the paper. After the necessary preliminaries (Section 2), we present our intuition on the
separation between coverage and submodular functions in Section 3. In Section 4, we present an overview
of the proof of hardness for combinatorial public projects, and in Section 5 an overview of the proof for
combinatorial auctions. The complete proofs are deferred to the appendices.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Mechanism Design Basics
Mechanism Design Problems. We consider mechanism design problems where there are n players, and
a set Ω of feasible solutions. Each player i has a non-negative valuation function vi : Ω → R+. We are
concerned with welfare maximization problems, where the objective is
∑n
i=1 vi(ω).
Mechanisms. We consider direct-revelation mechanisms for mechanism design problems. Such a mech-
anism comprises an allocation rule A, which is a function from (hopefully truthfully) reported valuation
functions v = (v1, . . . , vn) to an outcome A(v) ∈ Ω, and a payment rule p, which is a function from reported
valuation functions to a required payment pi(v) from each player i. We allow the allocation and payment
rules to be randomized. We restrict our attention to mechanisms that are individually rational in expectation
— i.e. E[vi(A(v)) − pi(v)] ≥ 0 — and the payments are non-negative in expectation — i.e. E[pi(v)] ≥ 0 —
for each player i and each input v = (v1, . . . , vn), when the expectations are over the random coins of the
mechanism.
Truthfulness. A mechanism with allocation and payment rules A and p is truthful-in-expectation if every
player always maximizes its expected payoff by truthfully reporting its valuation function, meaning that
E[vi(A(v)) − pi(v)] ≥ E[vi(A(v′i, v−i))− pi(v′i, v−i)] (1)
for every player i, (true) valuation function vi, (reported) valuation function v
′
i, and (reported) valuation
functions v−i of the other players. The expectation in (1) is over the coin flips of the mechanism. If (1) holds
for every flip of the coins, rather than merely in expectation, we call the mechanism universally truthful.
VCG-Based Mechanisms. Mechanisms for welfare maximization problems are often variants of the
classical VCGmechanism. Recall that the VCG mechanism is defined by the (generally intractable) allocation
rule that selects the welfare-maximizing outcome with respect to the reported valuation functions, and the
payment rule that charges each player i a bid-independent “pivot term” minus the reported welfare earned
by other players in the selected outcome. This (deterministic) mechanism is truthful; see e.g. [22].
Let dist(Ω) denote the probability distributions over the set of feasible solutions Ω, and let R ⊆ dist(Ω)
be a compact subset of them. The correspondingMaximal in Distributional Range (MIDR) allocation rule is
defined as follows: given reported valuation functions v1, . . . , vn, return an outcome that is sampled randomly
from a distribution D∗ ∈ R that maximizes the expected welfare Eω∼D[
∑
i vi(ω)] over all distributions
D ∈ R. Analogous to the VCG mechanism, there is a (randomized) payment rule that can be coupled with
this allocation rule to yield a truthful-in-expectation mechanism (see [6]). We note that deterministic MIDR
allocation rules — i.e. those where R is a set of point distributions — are called maximal-in-range (MIR).
Approximate Truthfulness. For ǫ ≥ 0, a mechanism with allocation and payment rules A and p is
(1− ǫ)-approximately truthful-in-expectation if
E[vi(A(v)) − pi(v)] ≥ (1 − ǫ)E[vi(A(v′i, v−i))− pi(v′i, v−i)] (2)
for every player i, (true) valuation function vi, (reported) valuation function v
′
i, and (reported) valuation
functions v−i of the other players. The expectation in (2) is over the coin flips of the mechanism. Using
the fact that payments are non-negative in expectation, a (1 − ǫ)-approximately truthful-in-expectation
mechanism also satisfies the following weaker condition. (This condition is sufficient for our hardness results.)
E[vi(A(v)) − pi(v)] ≥ E[(1− ǫ)vi(A(v′i, v−i))− pi(v′i, v−i)] (3)
Approximately truthful mechanisms are related to approximately maximal-in-distributional-range allocation
rules. An allocation rule A : V → Ω is (1 − ǫ)-approximately maximal-in-distributional range if it fixes a
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R ⊆ dist(Ω), and returns an outcome that is sampled from D∗ ∈ R that (1 − ǫ)-approximately maximizes
the expected welfare Eω∼D[
∑
i vi(ω)] over all distributions D ∈ R. We show in Appendix A a sense in
which approximately maximal-in-distributional-range allocation rules are no less powerful – in terms of
approximating the social welfare – than approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanisms.
Our main reason for considering the notion of approximate truthfulness is that the mechanisms of [11, 13],
if implemented in the value oracle model, are only approximately truthful-in-expectation (for an arbitrarily
small ǫ > 0) [12]. The value oracle model seems too weak to make the mechanisms of [11, 13] exactly
truthful-in-expectation; however, [12] makes it quite conceivable that there might be an approximately
truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions and combinatorial public projects, both with
submodular valuations.
2.2 Combinatorial Auctions
In Combinatorial Auctions there is a set M of m items, and a set of n players. Each player i has a valuation
function vi : 2
M → R+ that is normalized (vi(∅) = 0) and monotone (vi(A) ≤ vi(B) whenever A ⊆ B). A
feasible solution is an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn), where Si denotes the items assigned to player i, and {Si}i are
mutually disjoint subsets of M . Player i’s value for outcome (S1, . . . , Sn) is equal to vi(Si). The goal is to
choose an allocation maximizing social welfare:
∑
i vi(Si).
2.3 Combinatorial Public Projects
In Combinatorial Public Projects there is a set [m] = {1, . . . ,m} of projects, a cardinality bound k such that
0 ≤ k ≤ m, and a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of players. Each player i has a valuation function vi : 2[m] → R+ that
is normalized (vi(∅) = 0) and monotone (vi(A) ≤ vi(B) whenever A ⊆ B). In this paper, we focus on the
flexible variant of combinatorial public projects: a feasible solution is a set S ⊆ [m] of projects with |S| ≤ k.
Player i’s value for outcome S is equal to vi(S). Prior work [23, 3, 9] has also considered the exact variant,
where a feasible solution is a set S ⊆ [m] with |S| = k. In both variants, the goal is to choose a feasible set
S maximizing social welfare:
∑
i vi(S).
3 Intuition - what fails for submodular valuations
The main obstacle in proving our hardness result for submodular functions is the fact that the natural
subclass of coverage functions does admit a truthful-in-expectation (1 − 1/e)-approximation [11]. In the
absence of strategic considerations, coverage functions capture the full difficulty of submodular functions in
the context of welfare maximization, in the sense that they exhibit the same hardness threshold of 1− 1/e.
Hence, it is not immediately clear where the dramatic jump in hardness should come from.
Let us recall the main idea of [11]: Let f : 2M → R+ be a submodular set function. Given x ∈ [0, 1]M , the
expected value of f(S) when S includes each item j independently with probability xj is measured by the
multilinear extension F (x), which has been previously used in work on submodular maximization [4, 24, 17,
25, ?]. F is an extension of f , in the sense that it agrees with f on integer points, and therefore maximizing
F (x) over fractional allocations would yield an optimal algorithm. However, F (x) is not a concave function
and can be maximized only approximately. Instead, the authors of [11] consider a different rounding process
— which they call the Poisson rounding scheme — that includes each j in S with probability 1 − e−xj
instead. The expected value of applying the Poisson rounding rounding scheme to a point x is measured
by a modified function F exp(x1, . . . , xm) = F (1 − e−x1 , . . . , 1 − e−xm), which fortuitously turns out to be
concave for a subclass of submodular functions, including coverage functions and weighted sums of matroid
rank functions. In this case, F exp(x) can be maximized exactly, and yields a maximal-in-distributional-
range algorithm whose range is the image of the Poisson rounding scheme. Since the ratio between F (x)
and F exp(x) is bounded by 1− 1/e, this leads to a truthful-in-expectation (1− 1/e)-approximation.
The first question is whether F exp can be maximized for any monotone submodular function. It was
observed by the authors of [11] that F exp is not concave for every submodular function: one example is the
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budget-additive function f(S) = min{∑i∈S wi, 2} where w1 = w2 = w3 = 1 and w4 = 2. Hence convex
optimization techniques cannot be used for F exp(x) directly; still, perhaps F exp(x) could be maximized for
a different reason. We prove that this is impossible, using a symmetry gap argument [15, 20, 25].
The budget-additive function above does not lend itself well to the symmetry gap argument, because
there is a clear asymmetry between the elements of weight 1 and the element of weight 2. Instead, we
construct an example where F exp is not concave and all elements are in some sense “equivalent”. For this
purpose, we use the following construction: If f1, f2 : 2
M → [0, 1] are monotone submodular functions, then
f(S) = 1− (1− f1(S))(1 − f2(S))
is also a monotone submodular function (see Lemma E.1). In particular, letM =M1∪M2, |M1| = |M2| = m,
|M | = 2m, and let fi(S) = min{ 1αm |S ∩Mi|, 1} for some α > 0. These are budget-additive and hence
monotone submodular functions. Then we set
f(S) = 1− (1 − f1(S))(1− f2(S)) = 1−
(
1− 1
αm
|S ∩M1|
)
+
(
1− 1
αm
|S ∩M2|
)
+
.
Here, (y)+ = max{y, 0} denotes the positive part of a number. By Lemma E.1, f(S) is a monotone
submodular function. Let’s consider the function F exp(x1, . . . , x2m) = F (1 − e−x1, . . . , 1 − e−x2m). If
m → ∞, a random set obtained by sampling with probabilities 1 − e−xi will have cardinality very close to∑
(1− e−xi). We obtain
F exp(x) ≃ 1−
(
1− 1
αm
∑
i∈M1
(1− e−xi)
)
+
1− 1
αm
∑
j∈M2
(1− e−xj )

+
.
The reader can verify that this function is concave for α = 1. But this is a very special coincidence. (The
reason is that f for α = 1 can be represented as a coverage function.) Any smaller value of α, for instance
α = 1/2, gives a non-concave function F exp, as can be seen by checking x = 1M1 , x = 1M2 and x =
1
21M :
F exp(1M1) = F
exp
2 (1M2) = 1 − (−1 + 2e−1)+ = 1 (note that −1 + 2e−1 < 0), while the value at the
midpoint is F exp
(
1
21M
) ≃ 1 − (−1 + 2e−1/2)2 = 4e−1/2 − 4e−1 ≃ 0.955. Therefore, we have an example
where F exp(x) is not concave and moreover, all elements play the same symmetric role in f . (Formally, f
has an element-transitive group of symmetries.) Functions of this type will play a crucial role in our proof.
The symmetry gap argument. The symmetry gap argument from [25], building up on previous work
[15, 20], shows the following: Instances exhibiting some kind of symmetry can be blown up and modified
in such a way that the only solutions that an algorithm can find (using a polynomial number of value
queries) are symmetric with respect to the same notion of symmetry. Thus the gap between symmetric and
asymmetric solutions implies an inapproximability threshold. We use this argument here as follows. The
instance above (for α = 1/2) can be slightly modified as in [15, 20, 25], in such a way that it is impossible
to find any solution that is asymmetric with respect to M1,M2. Consider the optimization problem
max{F exp(x) :
∑
xi ≤ m}.
The best symmetric solution is F exp(121M ) ≃ 0.955, while the optimum is F exp(1M1) = 1. The only
solutions found by a polynomial number of value queries are the symmetric ones, and hence we cannot solve
the optimization problem within a factor better than 0.955. A similar argument shows that we cannot solve
the welfare maximization problem (for 2 players) with respect to F exp(x) within a factor better than 0.955.
In the following, we harness this construction towards showing that there can be no good maximum-in-
distributional-range mechanism, and eventually, no good truthful-in-expectation mechanism.
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4 Hardness for combinatorial public projects
We start with the combinatorial public project problem. The (exact) combinatorial public project prob-
lem was introduced in [23] as a model problem for the study of truthful approximation mechanisms. This
problem is better understood than combinatorial auctions, in the sense that a useful characterization of
all deterministic truthful mechanisms is known: every truthful mechanism for 2 players is an affine max-
imizer — a weighted generalization of maximal-in-range mechanisms [23]. Using this characterization, it
was proved in [23] that the exact submodular CPP problem does not admit any (deterministic) truthful
mǫ−1/2-approximation using a subexponential amount of communication, and moreover there is no mǫ−1/2-
approximation even for a certain class of succintly represented submodular valuations unless NP ⊆ BPP .
In contrast, the simple greedy algorithm is a non-truthful (1−1/e)-approximation algorithm for this problem
[21]. This was the first example of such a dramatic gap in approximability between truthful mechanisms and
non-truthful algorithms.
In follow-up work, a simpler characterization-type statement for CPP was shown in [3]: Every truthful
mechanism for a single player with a coverage valuation can, via a non-uniform polynomial time reduction,
be converted to a truthful maximal-in-range mechanism without degrading its approximation ratio. Since
every truthful mechanism for n players must embed a truthful mechanism for a single player, this allowed
the authors to restrict attention to maximal-in-range mechanisms for a single player in proving an mǫ−1/2-
approximation threshold for CPP with coverage valuations, assuming that NP 6⊆ P/poly. The following
easy converse of their characterization is notable: A maximal-in-range mechanism for CPP with a single
player can directly be used as a maximal-in-range mechanism for any number of players.
Recently, it was proved by Dobzinski [9] that the exact variant of the submodular CPP problem (under the
constraint |S| = k) does not admit a truthful-in-expectationmǫ−1/2-approximation in the value oracle model.
However, as noted in [9], the flexible variant of CPP (under the constraint |S| ≤ k) is arguably more natural in
the strategic setting. For the flexible variant of CPP, [9] proves that there is no universally truthful mǫ−1/2-
approximation, but leaves open the possibility of a better truthful-in-expectation mechanism. Problems
that have a packing structure like flexible CPP have historically proven to be easier to approximate using
truthful-in-expectation mechanisms [19, 6, 10, 11]. Flexible CPP has exhibited a similar pattern; Dughmi
[13] recently designed a truthful-in-expectation (1 − 1/e)-approximation mechanism for CPP when players
have explicit coverage valuations (which is optimal regardless of strategic issues [14]), and more generally
when players have matroid rank sum valuations that support a certain randomized variant of value queries.
Transformation to MIDR mechanisms. While deterministic truthful mechanisms for the CPP problem
are no more powerful in terms of approximation than maximal-in-range mechanisms [23, 3], the situation is
slightly more complicated for randomized mechanisms. It is not clear whether truthful-in-expectation mech-
anisms are equivalent to maximal-in-distributional-range mechanisms. Nonetheless, we prove the following.
Theorem 4.1. For every ǫ ≥ 0 and c(m) > 0 the following holds. If there is a (1−ǫ)-approximately truthful-
in-expectation mechanism M for the (exact or flexible) CPP problem that achieves a c(m)-approximation for
submodular valuations on m elements, then for any δ > 0 there is a non-uniform (1− 3ǫ− δ)-approximately
maximal-in-distributional-range mechanism M′ that achieves a c(m)-approximation for submodular valua-
tions on m elements and uses at most m more value queries than M.
By a non-uniform mechanism, we mean a separate fixed mechanism for each input size m; i.e., the size of
the program can depend arbitrarily on m. The only bound on the non-uniform mechanism is the number of
value queries used. The main idea is that the although the range of prices offered by a truthful-in-expectation
mechanism can be unbounded, the mechanism can be made MIDR “in the limit”, when the input valuation
is scaled by a sufficiently large constant. This constant can be fixed for each input size m and acts as an
“advice string” to the mechanism. We present the proof in Appendix A.
Hardness for MIDR mechanisms. Our hardness result for flexible submodular CPP rules out mech-
anisms purely based on the number of value queries used, and hence it rules out even the non-uniform
mechanisms mentioned in Theorem 4.1.
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Theorem 4.2. There are absolute constants ǫ, γ > 0 such that there is no (1 − ǫ)-approximately maximal-
in-distributional-range mechanism for the flexible submodular CPP problem with 1 player in the value oracle
model, max{f(S) : |S| ≤ k}, achieving a better than 1/mγ-approximation in expectation in the objective
function, where m is the size of the ground set. This holds even for non-uniform mechanisms of arbitrary
computational complexity, as long as the number of value queries is bounded by poly(m).
In the following, we present a sketch of the proof of this theorem. The full proof appears in Appendix B.
Proof strategy. We assume that a mechanism optimizes over a range of distributions R. (We assume for
simplicity that the mechanism is MIDR rather than approximately MIDR.) We emphasize that the range
R is fixed beforehand, and the mechanism must optimize over R for any particular submodular function f .
This gives us a lot of flexibility in arguing about the properties of R.
Suppose that the size of the ground set is m = 2O(ℓ) and the cardinality bound is k = m/2ℓ. We
consider ℓ + 1 different “levels” of valuation functions. (See Figure 2.) At level 0, we have a set A(0) of
m/2ℓ items, where the valuation function is nonzero and additive. Assuming that the mechanism achieves
a c-approximation, there must be a distribution D0 ∈ R which allocates at least a c-fraction of A(0) in
expectation to player i. This must be true for every set A(0) of size m/2ℓ. It will be useful to think of this
set as random (and hidden from the mechanism.)
D0 D1
D2 D3
D4 D5
A(4) B(4)
A(3)
B(3)
A(2) B(2)
A(1)
B(1)
B(0)A(0)
Figure 2: A bisection sequence (A(j), B(j)), with the distributions Dj returned by the mechanism at level j.
The density of Dj increases in a certain technical sense exponentially in j, although much slower than 2
j.
At level j, 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, we have a (random) set A(j) of m/2ℓ−j items, which is partitioned randomly
into two sets A(j−1) ∪ B(j−1) of equal size; these are level-(j − 1) sets. The valuation function at level
j will be as in Section 3 but restricted to the set A(j) = A(j−1) ∪ B(j−1) (the two parts play the role
of M1,M2 from Section 3). The mechanism can detect the set A
(j); however, the partition of A(j) into
A(j−1) ∪ B(j−1) remains hidden. By the symmetry gap argument, the mechanism cannot learn what the
partition is, and hence any distribution Dj returned by the algorithm will be with high probability balanced
with respect to (A(j−1), B(j−1)). The MIDR property implies that this distribution must be “dense” enough
in order to beat the distribution Dj−1 guaranteed by the previous level, which is sensitive to the partition
(A(j−1), B(j−1)). (By density, we mean a certain notion of average size for sets sampled from Dj .) Since
distributions concentrated inside A(j−1) or B(j−1) are more profitable than distributions balanced between
(A(j−1), B(j−1)), we will ideally obtain a constant-factor boost in density at each level. As ℓ grows, this will
eventually contradict the fact that the mechanism cannot choose more than k items.
Finding the right definition of density that yields a constant-factor boost at each level is the main technical
difficulty. The most natural definition of density seems to be the expected size of the set returned by the
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mechanism. However, this notion does not yield the desired boost. (This is related to the fact that we
cannot get any contradiction for coverage functions.) The notion of density that turns out to be useful is
more complicated; it is derived from functions that exhibit non-concave behavior of the extension F exp. This
strategy will be made more explicit in the following.
The symmetry gap. At level j + 1, we consider valuation functions of the form
fA(j),B(j)(S) = 1−
(
1− φ
( |S ∩ A(j)|
|A(j)|
))(
1− φ
( |S ∩B(j)|
|B(j)|
))
where φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a suitable non-decreasing concave function. Note that under this valuation function,
the value of a (random) set R depends only on how many elements it takes from A(j) and B(j). In particular,
if we denote Xj =
|R∩A(j)|
|A(j)|
, Yj =
|R∩B(j)|
|B(j)|
, then we have
E[fA(j),B(j)(R)] = E[1− (1− φ(Xj))(1− φ(Yj))].
Since the expected value depends only on Xj , Yj , we say that the random variables Xj, Yj represent the
distribution of R.
By the symmetry gap argument (if the valuation function is suitably perturbed and the partition
(A(j), B(j)) is random), then the mechanism with high probability returns a solution R(j+1) independent of
the partition and hence symmetric with respect to it. Denoting Xj+1 =
|R(j+1)∩A(j+1)|
|A(j+1)|
, we obtain that the
mechanism returns expected value
E[fA(j),B(j)(R
(j+1))] = E[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2]
which is typically less than E[1 − (1 − φ(Xj))(1 − φ(Yj))] if Xj+1 = 12 (Xj + Yj) and Xj 6= Yj . (There are
certain error terms arising from the symmetry gap argument but let us ignore them for now.)
The main point here is that if the mechanism is MIDR, then the expected value of the returned random
set E[fA(j),B(j)(R
(j+1))] must be at least that of any other random set whose distribution is in the range - in
particular, the random set R(j) whose presence in the range we prove at the previous level. If this random
set R(j) is represented by the random variables Xj , Yj , then the mechanism must return a distribution
represented by Xj+1 such that
E[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2] ≥ E[1− (1− φ(Xj))(1− φ(Yj))].
We in fact ignore the contribution of Yj and use the weaker inequality
E[1− (1 − φ(Xj+1))2] ≥ E[φ(Xj)]. (4)
Hence, the existence of certain distributions in the range forces the existence of other distributions, satisfying
the bound (4).
Gap amplification. Now we would like to say that if two distributions represented by Xj and Xj+1 satisfy
(4), then the distribution at level j + 1 is “more dense” than the one at level j. Considering the scaling
at different levels, we want to prove that Xj+1 is “significantly larger” than
1
2Xj . This is intuitive, since
Xj+1 =
1
2Xj is not enough to satisfy (4), for example when φ is linear. Unfortunately, (4) does not imply
any useful relationship between the expectations E[Xj], E[Xj+1], beyond E[Xj+1] ≥ 12E[Xj ]. For example,
we could have Xj = 1 with probability ξ− ξ2 and 0 otherwise. Then Xj+1 = 12ξ satisfies (4) for any concave
function φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. This does not provide a constant-factor improvement over 12E[Xj].
We still want to prove that Xj+1 is in some sense “significantly larger” than
1
2Xj. Our main technical
inequality formalizing this intuition is the following: Define φα(t) = min
{
t
α , 1
}
. Then for any distribution
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in the range represented by Xj at level j and any αj ∈ [0, 1], there is a distribution in the range represented
by Xj+1 at level j + 1, and αj+1 ∈ [0, 1] such that
αj+1(E[φαj+1 (Xj+1)])
1+δ ≥
(
1 + δ2
2
)
αj(E[φαj (Xj)])
1+δ . (5)
where δ > 0 is some (small) absolute constant. The use of 1 + δ in the exponent is crucial here. We remark
that formulating and proving this inequality was the most challenging part of the proof. (The precise
statement with a proof appears as Lemma B.6 in the appendix.)
The contradiction. Using this bound, we arrive at a contradiction as follows. As we already mentioned,
assuming that an MIDR mechanism provides a c-approximation for the CPP problem, then for any feasible
set A(0) there must be a distribution D0 in its range such that
E[X0] = ER∼D0
[ |R ∩ A(0)|
|A(0)|
]
≥ c.
Now we apply the symmetry gap argument and the gap amplification technique to random pairs of sets
(A(j), B(j)) at each level j. Starting from E[X0] ≥ c and α0 = 1, by repeated use of (5) we obtain that there
is αℓ ∈ [0, 1] and a distribution at level ℓ represented by Xℓ such that
αℓ(E[φαℓ(Xℓ)])
1+δ ≥
(
1 + δ2
2
)ℓ
c1+δ.
Note that αℓ(E[φαℓ(Xℓ)])
1+δ ≤ αℓE[φαℓ(Xℓ)] = E[min{Xℓ, αℓ}] ≤ E[Xℓ]. So in fact
E[Xℓ] ≥
(
1 + δ2
2
)ℓ
c1+δ >
2δ
2ℓ
2ℓ
c1+δ.
The meaning of Xℓ is simply the fraction of the ground set that the mechanism returns at level ℓ. Since
m = 2O(ℓ), we have 2δ
2ℓ ≥ m(1+δ)γ for some constant γ > 0. If the approximation factor is c ≥ m−γ , then
we get E[Xℓ] > 2
−ℓ, which would violate the cardinality constraint of the CPP problem.
As we mentioned, the full proof appears in Appendix B.
5 Hardness for combinatorial auctions
The following is our main result for combinatorial auctions.
Theorem 5.1. There are absolute constants ǫ, γ > 0 such that there is no (1 − ǫ)-approximately truthful-
in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with monotone submodular valuation functions in the
value oracle model, achieving a better than 1/nγ-approximation in expectation in terms of social welfare,
where the number of players is n and the number of items is m = poly(n).
Discussion. This theorem extends previous negative results for combinatorial auctions with submodular
valuation functions, which were known in the cases of deterministic truthful and randomized universally
truthful mechanisms [9]. Also, it appears that as stated these results do not rule out approximately truthful
mechanisms.
We remark that there is still the possibility of a truthful-in-expectation mechanism in the “lottery-value”
oracle model which was introduced in [11]. Here, a player is able to provide the exact expectation E[vi(x̂)]
for a product distribution given by x. Since the exact expectations E[vi(x̂)] are hard to compute even
in very special cases like the budget-additive case, this is a severe limitation. Our hardness result does
not apply directly to this stronger oracle model. However, what our result implies is that if a truthful-in-
expectation mechanism exists in the lottery-value model, then it must be very sensitive to the accuracy of
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the oracle’s answers, and does not remain even approximately truthful-in-expectation if the oracle’s answers
involve some small noise. This is because if we had a mechanism in the lottery-value oracle model, which
remains approximately t.i.e. under small noise in the oracle and provides a good approximation, then we
could simulate this mechanism in the value oracle model (by sample-average approximation). Thus we would
obtain an approximately t.i.e. mechanism contradicting Theorem 5.1.
Proof strategy. Our hardness result for combinatorial public projects (Section 4) can be adapted to show
that there is no (approximately) MIDR mechanism for submodular combinatorial auctions that guarantees
a good approximation ratio. However, unlike in CPP, we are unable to prove that truthful-in-expectation
mechanisms and MIDR algorithms are equivalent in power (even in the approximate sense). This is not
surprising, since randomized truthful mechanisms that are not maximal-in-distributional-range have been
designed for combinatorial auctions (see for example [5]). Therefore, additional ideas are needed to rule out
all truthful-in-expectation mechanisms. Such ideas have been recently put forth in a paper by Dobzinski [9].
The direct hardness approach of [9] provides a way to avoid the characterization step and instead attack the
truthful mechanism directly. This idea applies to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms as well.
The main idea of the direct hardness approach can be stated as follows. If we identify a special player
whose range of possible allocations is sufficiently “rich” when the valuations of other players are fixed to
particular functions, then we can work with the special player directly using the taxation principle: There
is a fixed price for each distribution over allocations in the “range” of the mechanism as the special player
varies his valuation, and the mechanism outputs the distribution in this range that maximizes the player’s
utility (his expected value for the distribution on allocations less the price of that distribution). Thus, our
symmetry gap techniques from Section 4 apply here quite naturally, though the presence of payments poses
an additional technical challenge that was not present for CPP. Next, we present a sketch of our proof. The
complete proof is presented in Appendix C.
The basic instance. We start from the following “basic instance”. For an integer ℓ, we construct instances
with |N | = n = 2ℓ players and |M | = m = poly(n) items. Each player has a “polar valuation” v∗i (as in [9]),
where items in a certain set A
(0)
i have value 1 for player i and other items have (small) value ω > 0. The
sets A
(0)
i are chosen independently at random, under the constraint that |A(0)i | = m/n.
A counting argument shows that if a mechanism provides a c-approximation in social welfare, then there
must be a player whose allocated set R
(0)
i overlaps significantly with his desired set A
(0)
i :
E[|R(0)i ∩ A(0)i |] ≥ (c/4− ω)E[|R(0)i ∪ A(0)i |].
(See Lemma C.3.) By an averaging argument, this is also true for a certain fixed choice of the other players’
valuations. In the following, we fix that choice and consider varying valuations for player i only, who we refer
to as the “special player”. We also drop the index i, since we do not consider the other players anymore.
In the following, we set ω = c/8, so that E[|R(0) ∩A(0)|] ≥ ωE[|R(0) ∪A(0)|]. Hence we can estimate the
expected value received by the special player as follows:
E[v∗(R(0))] = E[|R(0) ∩ A(0)|] + ωE[|R(0) \A(0)|] ≤ 2E[|R(0) ∩ A(0)|].
Denoting X0 =
|R(0)∩A(0)|
|A(0)|
, we have E[v∗(R(0))] ≤ 2mn E[X0]. Also, E[v∗(R(0))] ≥ E[|R(0) ∩A(0)|] = mn E[X0].
So the special player’s utility in the basic instance (in expectation over the random instances) is mn E[X0],
up to a factor of 2.
Symmetry gap again. We consider valuations for the special player at ℓ levels, in the same form that
we considered in the case of combinatorial public projects. The difference now is that the mechanism is
not necessarily maximal-in-distributional-range. Instead, we use the definition of truthfulness in expectation
directly. The same symmetry gap argument as in Section 4 gives the following: If there is a random set R(j)
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possibly allocated at level j at a price Pj , and Xj =
|R(j)∩A(j)|
|A(j)|
, then there is a random set R(j+1) possibly
allocated at level j + 1 at a price Pj+1, and Xj+1 =
|R(j+1)∩A(j+1)|
|A(j+1)|
, so that
E[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2]−E[Pj+1] ≥ E[φ(Xj)]−E[Pj ].
Again, we are ignoring certain error terms and we are also ignoring the issue of approximate truthfulness.
Using the fact that the valuation functions can be scaled arbitrarily and the mechanism must still be truthful
in expectation, we obtain that for any λ′, λ′′ ≥ 0, there is distribution possibly allocated at level j + 1 such
that
λ′E[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2]− λ′′E[Pj+1] ≥ λ′E[φ(Xj)]− λ′′E[Pj ]. (6)
Convex hulls and the separation argument. Our goal is to eliminate the prices from the picture, so
that we can use arguments similar to Section 4. For that purpose, it is convenient to pass to convex hulls
as follows. We define the distribution menu Mj at level j to consist of all distributions of pairs of random
variables (Xj , Pj), such that Xj =
|R(j)∩A(j)|
|A(j)|
for some random set R(j) allocated for a level-j valuation at a
price Pj . Then we define the closure of a distribution menu, Mj , to be the topological closure of the convex
hull of Mj (in the sense of taking convex combinations of distributions). By convexity, (6) still holds in
the sense that for any (Xj , Pj) with a distribution in Mj and any λ′, λ′′ ≥ 0, there is (Xj+1, Pj+1) with a
distribution in Mj+1 such that (6) holds.
A convex separation argument, essentially Farkas’ lemma in 2 dimensions, actually implies the following.
For any (Xj , Pj) with a distribution in Mj , there is (Xj+1, Pj+1) with a distribution in Mj+1 such that
E[Pj+1] ≤ E[Pj ] and
E[1− (1 − φ(Xj+1))2] ≥ E[φ(Xj)].
In other words, there is a distribution in the closure of the menu at level j + 1 at a price no higher than the
price we had at level j, and the respective random variables Xj , Xj+1 satisfy the same relationship (4) that
we had in Section 4. The rest of the proof goes exactly as in Section 4, using (5) and eventually producing
a distribution represented by (Xℓ, Pℓ) in Mℓ such that E[Pℓ] ≤ E[P0] and
E[Xℓ] ≥
(
1 + δ2
2
)ℓ
(E[X0])
1+δ.
Here, (X0, P0) represents the distribution and price allocated in the basic instance. Now we consider the
utility that the distribution represented by (Xℓ, Pℓ) would provide in the basic instance: since every element
has value at least ω there, the utility would be
E[v∗(R(ℓ))− Pℓ] ≥ E[ωmXℓ − Pℓ] ≥ ωm
(
1 + δ2
2
)ℓ
(E[X0])
1+δ −E[P0]. (7)
Recall that the distribution of (Xℓ, Pℓ) is not on the menu Mℓ but rather in its convex hull. However, by
using the properties of the convex hull, there must be a distribution on the actual menu Mℓ that satisfies
the same linear inequality. So we can assume without loss of generality that the distribution of (Xℓ, Pℓ) is
on the actual menu at level ℓ, and R(ℓ) is the respective random set that would be allocated to the special
player if he declared a level-ℓ valuation.
Recall that in the basic instance, the value received by the special player is at most 2mn E[X0], and
the respective utility is at most 2mn E[X0] − E[P0]. We also have n = 2ℓ and E[X0] ≥ c/4 − ω = c/8.
If c = 8ω ≥ n−γ for a suitable constant γ > 0, we would obtain from (7) that the special player could
substantially improve his utility in the basic instance by declaring a level-ℓ valuation instead. We conclude
that this would contradict the property of truthfulness in expectation.
The complete proof appears in Appendix C.
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A Transforming an approximately truthful-in-expectation mech-
anism into approximately maximal-in-distribution range
In this section, we prove Theorem 4.1.
Let Ω = {S ⊆ [m] : |S| ≤ k} be the set of outcomes of CPP. Let ∆(Ω) denote the simplex in RΩ, repre-
senting the set of distributions over Ω. Let V denote the set of submodular valuations on [m]. We think of
V as a subset of RΩ+ — specifically, each v ∈ V is a vector in RΩ+, where vS is the value of outcome S for a
player with valuation v. We note that for each v ∈ V , the infinity norm ||v||∞ is equal to the value of the
optimum solution.
Fix ǫ, c, M, and δ as in the statement of the theorem. Let A : V → ∆(Ω) be the allocation rule of M
when there is a single player. By assumption, A is a c-approximation for c > 0 – specifically, vTA(v)||v||∞ ≥ c.
The following is an approximate variant of weak monotonicity [18], and follows from the fact that A is the
allocation rule of a (1− ǫ)-approximately truthful mechanism.
Fact A.1 (Similar to [18]). For any u, v ∈ V,
vTA(v) − (1− ǫ)uTA(v) ≥ (1− ǫ)vTA(u)− uTA(u).
We prove Theorem 4.1 by showing that there is a black-box reduction that converts A to a new allocation
rule B that is (1 − 3ǫ − δ)-MIDR. The reduction will be non-uniform – specifically, B will utilize an advice
string that depends on m, but is independent of the input valuation v ∈ V . The length of the advice string
will not be bounded, polynomially or otherwise — this is OK, since we are only interested in preserving
value oracle lower-bounds. B preserves the approximation ratio of A, and moreover makes only m more
value queries than does A.
The proof consists of two main steps. First, we show that A tends to a (1 − ǫ)-approximately maximal-
in-distributional-range allocation rule “in the limit” as we scale up the valuations. Then, we use this fact to
construct, via a non-uniform black box reduction, an allocation rule B that approximates the limit behavior
of A, in the sense that it (1 − 3ǫ− δ)-approximately maximizes over the range of A.
Remark A.2. We note that the proofs of this section apply more generally than CPP with submodular
valuations. In particular, the only properties of this problem that are used in the proofs are: (1) The
multiple-player allocation problem is algorithmically equivalent to the single player allocation problem (2)
The set Ω of outcomes is finite, (3) The set of valuations V ⊆ RΩ+ is closed under scaling by a non-negative
constant, and (4) There is a deterministic algorithm s : V → R+ that runs in finite time, makes a polynomial
number of value queries, and returns a “weak approximation” to the optimal value – i.e. we only require
that s(v) > 0 when ||v||∞ > 0. When a welfare-maximization mechanism design problem satisfies these four
conditions, as do all variants of CPP and other “public-project”-type problems in the literature, then the
analogue of Theorem 4.1 holds for that problem.
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A.1 Limit behavior of truthful in expectation mechanisms
We will show that A is (1− ǫ)-approximately MIDR in the limit as we scale up the valuations. Recall that a
mechanism B : V → ∆(Ω) is (1 − ǫ)-approximately MIDR if vTB(v) ≥ (1 − ǫ) supw∈V vTB(w) for all v ∈ V .
The following statement is analogous.
Proposition A.3. lim infα→∞ v
TA(αv) ≥ (1− ǫ) supw∈V vTA(w) for all v ∈ V.
Proof. Let α, β ∈ R+, and let w, v ∈ V . By Fact A.1:
αvTA(αv) − (1 − ǫ)wTA(αv) ≥ (1− ǫ)αvTA(w) − wTA(w).
Dividing the expression by α, we get:
vTA(αv) − (1− ǫ)w
TA(αv)
α
≥ (1 − ǫ)vTA(w) − w
TA(w)
α
Taking the limit infimum as α goes to infinity,
lim inf
α→∞
vTA(αv) ≥ (1− ǫ)vTA(w).
Now, taking the supremum over w
lim inf
α→∞
vTA(αv) ≥ (1− ǫ) sup
w∈V
vTA(w)
This completes the proof.
A.2 Approximating the limit behavior of a mechanism
Ideally, we would transform A to an allocation rule that behaves as A does in the limit – by the results of the
previous sub-section, such a “limit allocation rule” of A would be (1−ǫ)-MIDR. However, since our reduction
must take finite time, we must settle for approximating the limit behavior of A. Unfortunately, even that
is non-trivial: given v, the ratio α by which we would need to scale v before coming close to the “limit” of
A(αv) is a complete mystery, and may be arbitrarily large. Therefore, we need to utilize some non-uniform
advice to deduce that order of magnitude of the necessary scaling factor. An additional difficulty is that this
advice must be independent of v – specifically, the advice may depend only on the number of items m.
For each δ′ > 0 and v ∈ V , we define a threshold t(δ′, v). Roughly speaking, t(δ′, v) is the “scale” at
which A is guaranteed to be within (1 − δ′) of its limit behavior when given input in the direction of v.
Proposition A.3 guarantees that threshold t(δ′, v) exists for each v ∈ V and δ′ > 0.
t(δ′, v) = sup
{
t : vTA
(
t
v
||v||∞
)
≤ (1− ǫ− δ′) sup
w∈V
vTA(w)
}
+ 1 (8)
We note that the motivation for adding 1 (any arbitrary positive number would do) to the expression is
to guarantee that vTA
(
t(δ′, v) v||v||∞
)
≥ (1 − ǫ − δ′) supw∈V vTA(w), which may not be guaranteed by the
supremum.
Assume that, for some δ′ > 0, we have some upper-bound τ on {t(δ′, v) : v ∈ V}, and moreover we
have a procedure s(v) to estimate a non-zero lower bound on ||v||∞ for each v ∈ V . Then, the following
procedure is evidently a c-approximate and (1 − ǫ − δ′)-MIDR allocation rule: Given input v ∈ V , output
A( τs(v) · v). The procedure s(v) is easy to implement using only m value queries — indeed, we can take
s(v) = maxj∈[m] v({j}). It is not clear, however, that the upper-bound τ can be computed effectively. Even
worse, it is not clear that such an upper-bound even exists: V is infinite, and t(δ′, v) is not necessarily a
continuous function of v!
We remedy this as follows. We will show that there exists such an upper-bound when δ′ is sufficiently large
relative to ǫ. Specifically, we show that there exists an upper-bound τ on {t(δ + 2ǫ, v) : v ∈ V}. However,
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computing such an upper-bound in finite time may be impossible in general, since the scale of valuations at
which A approaches its limit behavior may be arbitrary. Instead, we take τ as advice to our non-uniform
reduction. By the discussion in the previous paragraph, showing that the upper-bound τ exists yields a
non-uniform allocation rule that is (1 − 3ǫ − δ)-MIDR, and makes at most m more value queries than A,
completing the proof of Theorem 4.1.
As a tool for proving that the upper-bound τ exists, we define a finite net of V . Since V is a cone in
finite-dimensional euclidean space, its intersection with the infinity-norm unit ball admits a σ-net in the
infinity-norm for any σ > 0 — specifically, a finite set U ⊆ V such that
1. ||u||∞ = 1 for all u ∈ U
2. ∀v ∈ V ∃u ∈ U
∣∣∣∣∣∣ v||v||∞ − u∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ σ
Let σ = cδ/4 and let U be a σ-net of V . Now let β = maxu∈U t( δ4 , u), and let τ = 4β/δ. It suffices to
show that vTA(τv) ≥ (1 − 3ǫ − δ) supw∈V vTA(w) for each v ∈ V with ||v||∞ = 1. Let v ∈ V be such that
||v||∞ = 1, and let u be a point in the σ-net U such that ||v − u||∞ ≤ σ. By Fact A.1, we have
τvTA(τv) − (1 − ǫ)βuTA(τv) ≥ (1 − ǫ)τvTA(βu)− βuTA(βu) (9)
We now use inequality (9) to lower-bound vTA(τv):
vTA(τv) ≥ (1− ǫ)vTA(βu)− β
τ
uTA(βu) Dividing (9) by τ and loosening the inequality
= (1− ǫ)vTA(βu)− δ
4
uTA(βu) By definition of τ
=
(
1− ǫ− δ
4
)
uTA(βu) − (1− ǫ)(u− v)TA(βu)
≥
(
1− ǫ− δ
4
)
uTA(βu) − ||u− v||∞ Since ||A(βu)||1 = 1
≥
(
1− ǫ− δ
4
)
uTA(βu) − σ By proximity of u and v
≥
(
1− ǫ− δ
2
)
uTA(βu) By c ≤ uTA(βu) and definition of σ
≥
(
1− 2ǫ− 3
4
δ
)
sup
w∈V
uTA(w) By definition of β
≥
(
1− 2ǫ− 3
4
δ
)
lim inf
α→∞
uTA(αv)
=
(
1− 2ǫ− 3
4
δ
)
lim inf
α→∞
(vTA(αv) − (v − u)TA(αv))
≥
(
1− 2ǫ− 3
4
δ
)
lim inf
α→∞
(vTA(αv) − ||v − u||∞) Since ||A(αv)||1 = 1
≥
(
1− 2ǫ− 3
4
δ
)
lim inf
α→∞
(vTA(αv) − σ) By proximity of u and v
≥
(
1− 2ǫ− 3
4
δ
)
lim inf
α→∞
(vTA(αv) − δ
4
vTA(αv)) By c ≤ vTA(αv) and definition of σ
≥ (1− 2ǫ− δ) lim inf
α→∞
vTA(αv)
≥ (1− 3ǫ− δ) sup
w∈V
vTA(w) By Proposition A.3
By the previous discussion, this completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
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B Proof of hardness for combinatorial public projects
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 4.2.
B.1 The basic setup
We consider a ground set of |M | = m = 400ℓ items for some ℓ ≥ 1. We set the cardinality bound to be
k = 200ℓ = m/n where n = 2ℓ. (We note that n is just a parameter unrelated to the number of players, which
is 1 in this case. This parameter will however denote the number of players in Section 5.) An important
object in the following will be a random bisection sequence.
Definition B.1. A random bisection sequence is a random sequence of pairs of sets (A(0), B(0)), (A(1), B(1)),
. . ., (A(ℓ), B(ℓ)) generated as follows. We define A(ℓ) = B(ℓ) = M . Given A(j) for 0 < j ≤ ℓ, we pick
(A(j−1), B(j−1)) uniformly among all partitions of A(j) into two parts of size 12 |A(j)|.
I.e., |A(j)| = |B(j)| = 2j−ℓm. We refer to A(j) = A(j−1) ∪ B(j−1) as the j-th level of the bisection
sequence. Observe that the distribution of (A(j−1), B(j−1)) is uniform among all pairs of disjoint sets of size
2j−1−ℓm. We will use valuation functions associated with each level of a bisection sequence. We denote
these valuation functions at level j by fA(j−1),B(j−1) . In particular, this valuation function depends only on
the elements of A(j) = A(j−1) ∪B(j−1).
The bisection sequence is generated at random and unknown to the mechanism. For each particular choice
of a valuation function at a certain level, the mechanism needs to produce a probability distribution over
feasible sets, which is purportedly the (approximately) optimal one over a certain fixed range of distributions
R. The distribution will depend on the choice of a valuation function, in particular on the relevant set of
items A(j). A function assigning a distribution over sets to every set A(j) is a complicated object; in order to
be able to argue about all possible such functions, we distill the important information into a single random
variable for each level j.
Definition B.2. We say that a random variable Xj is constructible by a range R at level j, if there is a
distribution D(A(j)) ∈ R for each set A(j) of size 2j−ℓm such that if a random set R is generated by first
choosing A(j) uniformly among all sets of size 2j−ℓm and then sampling R from the distribution D(A(j)),
then
Xj =
|R ∩ A(j)|
|A(j)| .
Note that the normalization is chosen so that we have Xj ∈ [0, 1]. There are two sources of randomness
in defining Xj : one is the randomness in A
(j), and one arises from the probability distribution D(A(j)).
The first useful fact is the following (easy) lemma.
Lemma B.3. Consider a mechanism returning distributions from a range R that achieves a c-approximation
for the problem max{f(S) : |S| ≤ k} for f monotone submodular. Then there is a random variable X0
constructible by R at level 0 such that
E[X0] ≥ c.
Proof. Consider the valuation function fA(0)(S) =
|S∩A(0)|
|A(0)|
. Let X0 =
|R(0)∩A(0)|
|A(0)|
where R(0) is the random
set returned by the mechanism, given valuation fA(0) for A
(0) chosen randomly among all sets of size 2−ℓm.
By Definition B.2, X0 is a random variable constructible by the range R at level 0.
Since the optimum under valuation fA(0) is 1 (achieved by A
(0) itself), the mechanism should return
expected value at least c. The value returned by the mechanism is exactly the random variable X0, hence
E[X0] ≥ c.
We remark that Lemma B.3 is the only place where we use the assumption of c-approximation. In the
following, our goal is to use the MIDR property to argue about distributions that must be in the range at
higher levels, and prove successive bounds on the random variables X1, X2, . . ..
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B.2 The symmetry gap argument
The main building block of our proof is a symmetry gap argument whose goal is to show the following. If the
mechanism optimizes over a certain fixed range R which supports distributions of “high density” at level j,
then R must support distributions of even higher density (when properly scaled) at level j+1. However, the
way we measure density is quite intricate. Recall the random variables X0, X1, . . . , Xℓ that encode certain
distributions in the range at each level. It would be nice to say that for any Xj constructible at level j, there
must be Xj+1 constructible at level j + 1 such that E[Xj+1] >
1+δ
2 E[Xj ] (which would correspond to sets
of larger cardinality at level j + 1 than j). But this is not true - the distributions of Xj , Xj+1 also matter
and we cannot get a guaranteed boost just in terms of expectation. Instead, we define a measure of density
using a test function φ that we specify later. The symmetry gap argument allows us to prove the following.
Lemma B.4. Let φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be a non-decreasing concave function. Fix j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ− 1} and a set
A(j+1) of size 2j+1−ℓm ≥ m/n. Let (A(j), B(j)) be a random partition of A(j+1) into two sets of equal size.
Then there is a monotone submodular function f˜A(j),B(j) for each partition (A
(j), B(j)) such that
• For any distribution of a random set R(j) (possibly correlated with A(j)) and the associated random
variable Xj =
|R(j)∩A(j)|
|A(j)|
, we have
E[f˜A(j),B(j)(R
(j))] ≥ E[φ(Xj − nm−1/2)].
• Any mechanism that uses poly(n) value queries, when applied to the random input f˜A(j),B(j) will return
a random set R(j+1) such that for the random variable Xj+1 =
|R(j+1)∩A(j+1)|
|A(j+1)|
,
E[f˜A(j),B(j)(R
(j+1))] ≤ E[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2] + e−Ω(n).
The expectations are over both (A(j), B(j)) and R(j) or R(j+1) respectively.
The key point here is that the performance of a mechanism depends only on the fraction of elements
taken from A(j+1), and not on the partition (A(j), B(j)). While there might be a “good distribution” R(j) in
the range which is correlated with A(j), the mechanism cannot find such a distribution and must compensate
for it by returning larger sets. This will be important later.
The proof of Lemma B.4 relies on the notion of symmetry gap developed in [15, 20, 25]. Since what we
need here is a special case where the construction can be carried out explicitly quite easily, we present a
self-contained proof here instead of referring to the general framework of [25].
Proof. Consider a pair of sets (A(j), B(j)). Given a non-decreasing concave function φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] , we
define the valuation function fA(j),B(j) as follows:
fA(j),B(j)(S) = 1−
(
1− φ
( |S ∩A(j)|
|A(j)|
))(
1− φ
( |S ∩B(j)|
|B(j)|
))
.
The function depends only on how many elements we take from A(j) and how many from B(j). Moreover,
the two sets play the same role in fA(j),B(j) ; i.e., all elements in A
(j+1) = A(j) ∪B(j) contribute equivalently
to fA(j),B(j) . This is the kind of situation where we can apply a symmetry gap argument.
Let us simplify the notation and write
ψ(x, y) = 1− (1− φ(x))(1 − φ(y)),
where x, y ∈ [0, 1]; i.e. fA(j),B(j)(S) = ψ
(
|S∩A(j)|
|A(j)|
, |S∩B
(j)|
|B(j)|
)
. It is elementary to verify that since φ is non-
decreasing concave, the first partial derivatives of ψ are non-negative and non-increasing with respect to
both coordinates. Now we replace ψ by a modified function ψ˜ which has the property that if |x− y| is very
small, the function value depends only on x + y. This can be accomplished explicitly as follows: For some
β > 0, let
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• ψ˜(x, y) = ψ(12 (x+ y), 12 (x + y)) if |x− y| ≤ β.
• ψ˜(x, y) = ψ(x− 12β, y + 12β) if x− y > β.
• ψ˜(x, y) = ψ(x+ 12β, y − 12β) if y − x > β.
ψ(x, y) ψ˜(x, y)
0 1
1
0 1
1
Figure 3: Construction of ψ˜(x, y) from ψ(x, y), assuming that ψ(x, y) = 1 − (1 − x)(1 − y). The solid lines
denote the diagonal x = y and the shifted diagonals x− y = ±β. The gray lines are the level sets of ψ(x, y)
and ψ˜(x, y).
Geometrically, this construction can be seen as taking the graph of ψ(x, y), pulling it away from the
diagonal x = y on both sides, and patching the area close to the diagonal with a function which depends
only on x + y and is equal to the function on the diagonal. Using the properties of ψ, one can check that
again the first partial derivatives of ψ˜ are non-negative and non-increasing with respect to both coordinates.
We define the function promised by the lemma as
f˜A(j),B(j)(S) = ψ˜
( |S ∩ A(j)|
|A(j)| ,
|S ∩B(j)|
|B(j)|
)
.
The properties of ψ˜ imply that f˜A(j),B(j) is a monotone submodular function (see e.g. [20, 25]).
We observe the following (which is the case in all proofs using the symmetry gap). For a “typical query”
S, oblivious to the random partition (A(j), B(j)), with high probability S will contain approximately the
same number of elements from these two sets. (Recall that |A(j)| = |B(j)|.) We call a query S balanced if
the parameters x = |S∩A
(j)|
|A(j)|
and y = |S∩B
(j)|
|B(j)|
are in the range where |x− y| ≤ β, and hence f˜A(j),B(j)(S) =
ψ˜(x, y) = ψ(12 (x+y),
1
2 (x+y)) is independent of the particular partition (A
(j), B(j)). By Lemma D.1 (applied
to the ground set A(j+1)), the probability that any fixed query S is unbalanced is exponentially small:
Pr[|x − y| > β] = Pr
[
||S ∩ A(j)| − |S ∩B(j)|| > β|A(j)|
]
≤ e−Ω(β2|A(j+1)|).
Recall that |A(j+1)| = 2j+1−ℓm ≥ m/n. Therefore, if we pick β = nm−1/2, the probability is e−Ω(n). Let
us fix for now the random coin flips of the mechanism. As long as all query answers are independent of the
partition (A(j), B(j)), the mechanism will follow the same computation path, independent of (A(j), B(j)),
and we can use a union bound over its poly(n) queries. Hence, the probability that a mechanism ever makes
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a query such that |x − y| > β is poly(n)e−Ω(n) = e−Ω(n). This is still true if we average over the random
coin flips of the algorithm. Therefore, the output of the mechanism will be independent of (A(j), B(j)) with
probability 1− e−Ω(n).
To summarize, the output of the mechanism, R(j+1), is with high probability independent of (A(j), B(j))
and again by Lemma D.1 with high probability balanced with respect to (A(j), B(j)). Given the definition
of the random variable Xj+1 =
|R(j+1)∩A(j+1)|
|A(j+1)|
, this means the output random set contains an Xj+1-fraction
of the set A(j+1), approximately balanced between its two halves. For some |β′| ≤ 12β, the value of such a
set is
ψ˜(Xj+1 + β
′, Xj+1 − β′) = ψ(Xj+1, Xj+1) = 1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2.
Thus the expected value of this solution is E[fA(j),B(j)(R
(j+1))] ≤ E[1 − (1 − φ(Xj+1))2] + e−Ω(n) (where
e−Ω(n) accounts for the small probability of finding an unbalanced solution, whose value could be up to 1).
This proves the second statement of the lemma.
Finally, consider any random set R(j) and the associated random variable Xj =
|R(j)∩A(j)|
|A(j)|
. We have
f˜A(j),B(j)(R
(j))) ≥ f˜A(j),B(j)(R(j) ∩A(j)) = ψ˜(Xj , 0) ≥ ψ (Xj − β, 0) = φ (Xj − β) .
Therefore E[f˜A(j),B(j)(R
(j)))] ≥ E[φ(Xj − β)]. Recall that β = nm−1/2, so this proves the first statement of
the lemma.
Considering the setup of random variables X0, X1, . . . , Xℓ constructible by R at different levels (Sec-
tion B.1), we obtain the following.
Lemma B.5. Consider a mechanism of polynomial query-complexity that (1− ǫ)-approximately maximizes
over a range of distributions R for the problem max{f(S) : |S| ≤ k} for f monotone submodular, ground set
of size m = 400ℓ and k = 2−ℓm. Let φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a non-decreasing concave function. If a random
variable Xj is constructible by R at level j, then there is a random variable Xj+1 constructible by R at level
j + 1 such that
E[1− (1 − φ(Xj+1))2] ≥ (1− ǫ)E[φ(Xj − 10−ℓ)]− 10−ℓ.
Proof. Given φ, let f˜A(j),B(j) be the valuation function provided by Lemma B.4. Consider A
(j+1) uniformly
random among sets of size 2j+1−ℓm, bisected randomly into A(j) ∪B(j). If Xj is constructible by the range
R at level j, it means that for each A(j) there is a distribution D(A(j)) in R such that Xj = |R
(j)∩A(j)|
|A(j)|
where
A(j) is random and X(j) is sampled from D(A(j)). By Lemma B.4, conditioned on any A(j+1) and taking
expectation over the random partition (A(j), B(j)), E[f˜A(j),B(j)(R
(j)) | A(j+1)] ≥ E[φ(Xj−nm−1/2) | A(j+1)].
Therefore the same holds also without the conditioning. Recall that we have nm−1/2 = 2ℓ400−ℓ/2 = 10−ℓ.
So we get
E[f˜A(j),B(j)(R
(j))] ≥ E[φ(Xj − nm−1/2)] = E[φ(Xj − 10−ℓ)].
Now let us run the mechanism on the same random instance and denote the output random set by
R(j+1). By Lemma B.4, E[f˜A(j),B(j)(R
(j+1)) | A(j+1)] ≤ E[1 − (1 − φ(Xj+1))2 | A(j+1)] + e−Ω(n), where
Xj+1 =
|R(j+1)∩A(j+1)|
|A(j)|
. Hence this holds also without the conditioning:
E[f˜A(j),B(j)(R
(j+1))] ≤ E[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2] + e−Ω(n) ≤ E[1− (1 − φ(Xj+1))2] + 10−ℓ
and by definition Xj+1 is constructible by R at level j + 1.
To conclude, if the mechanism maximizes (1−ǫ)-approximately overR, then the expected value of R(j+1)
conditioned on (A(j), B(j)) must be at least (1 − ǫ)× that provided by R(j). Therefore, the same holds in
expectation over (A(j), B(j)), which means E[f˜A(j),B(j)(R
(j+1))] ≥ (1 − ǫ)E[f˜A(j),B(j)(R(j))] and the lemma
follows.
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B.3 The gap amplification argument
In this section, we develop an inductive argument based on Lemma B.3 and Lemma B.5, which proves that
a certain notion of density of the distributions at level j increases exponentially in j. By Lemma B.5, for
any Xj constructible at level j there is Xj+1 constructible at level j + 1 such that
E[1− (1 − φ(Xj+1))2] ≥ (1− ǫ)E[φ(Xj − 10−ℓ)]− 10−ℓ.
We want to prove that Xj+1 is in some sense “significantly larger” than
1
2Xj . Our main technical lemma
formalizing this intuition is the following.
Lemma B.6. There are absolute constants ǫ, δ > 0 such that the following holds for any sufficiently large
ℓ ∈ N. If X0, . . . ,Xℓ are collections of random variables in [0, 1] such that
• there is X0 in X0 such that E[X0] ≥ c for some c ≥ 2−ℓ, and
• for every Xj in Xj and every non-decreasing concave function φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], there is Xj+1 in Xj+1
such that
E[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2] ≥ (1− ǫ)E[φ(Xj − 10−ℓ)]− 10−ℓ
then there is a sequence of variables Xj in Xj and parameters 1 = α0 ≥ α1 ≥ . . . αℓ > 0 such that if we
define φα(t) = min
{
t
α , 1
}
then
αj(E[φαj (Xj)])
1+δ ≥
(
1 + δ2
2
)j
c1+δ.
The use of 1 + δ in the exponent is crucial here; note that it makes the statement stronger, but this is
what makes the inductive proof work. The intuitive meaning of this lemma is as follows: there exist random
variablesXj constructible at different levels that, when measured by suitable test functions, decrease roughly
as
(
1+δ2
2
)j
, rather than 12j . In terms of the cardinality of the returned sets, this means they increase by a
factor of (1 + δ2) at each level. This gives the exponential amplification that we need.
Proof. The base case j = 0 holds trivially with α0 = 1 and φα0(t) = t. To prove the inductive step, suppose
that there is αj ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies the statement of the lemma for Xj. Let us define ξj = E[φαj (Xj)];
then the inductive statement reads
αjξ
1+δ
j ≥
(
1 + δ2
2
)j
c1+δ. (10)
Our goal is to prove that αj+1ξ
1+δ
j+1 ≥ 1+δ
2
2 αjξ
1+δ
j , which implies the inductive statement for j + 1.
By assumption, for the non-decreasing concave function φαj , we get
E[1− (1− φαj (Xj+1))2] ≥ (1− ǫ)E[φαj (Xj − 10−ℓ)]− 10−ℓ.
First, we simplify the error terms on the right-hand side. Let us keep in mind that ǫ, δ > 0 are (small)
absolute constants which will be suitably chosen at the end of the proof. Recall that φαj (t) = min{ tαj , 1}.
Therefore, (1 − ǫ)E[φαj (Xj − 10−ℓ)] ≥ (1 − ǫ)E[φαj (Xj)] − 1αj10ℓ = (1 − ǫ)ξj − 1αj10ℓ . Recall the inductive
hypothesis (10). Since αj , ξj ∈ [0, 1], and c ≥ 2−ℓ, this means in particular that αjξj ≥ 2−jc1+δ ≥ 2−3ℓ.
Also, ξj ≥ 2−jc ≥ 2−2ℓ. Hence, we can estimate
E[1− (1− φαj (Xj+1))2] ≥ (1− ǫ)ξj −
1
αj10ℓ
− 1
10ℓ
≥
(
1− ǫ− 2
3ℓ
10ℓ
− 2
2ℓ
10ℓ
)
ξj ≥ (1 − 2ǫ)ξj (11)
for ℓ sufficiently large.
Now we come to the meat of the inductive argument. Instead of the expression E[1− (1− φαj (Xj+1))2],
we would like to estimate ξj+1 = E[φαj+1 (Xj+1)] for a suitable value of αj+1. The reason why the values
of αj are not specified by the lemma is that their choice depends on the particular distributions of Xj over
which we have no control. For example, αj+1 =
1
2αj is a natural choice which works for some distributions
of Xj+1 but not always. In the following, we split the analysis into 2 cases.
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Case 1: Pr[
Xj+1
αj
>
√
δ] > 2δξj .
In this case, Xj+1 is with non-negligible probability quite large, in the region where 1 − (1 −Xj+1/αj)2 is
significantly smaller than 2Xj+1/αj . In this case, we can gain by making αj+1 slightly larger than
1
2αj ,
specifically αj+1 =
1
2 (1 + δ)αj . We obtain:
ξj+1 = E[φαj+1 (Xj+1)] = E
[
min
{
Xj+1
αj+1
, 1
}]
= E
[
min
{
2Xj+1
(1 + δ)αj
, 1
}]
=
1
1 + δ
E
[
min
{
2Xj+1
αj
, 1 + δ
}]
.
Observe the following: min{ 2Xj+1αj , 1+δ} ≥ min{
2Xj+1
αj
, 1} ≥ 1−(1−φαj(Xj+1))2 for allXj+1 ≥ 0. Moreover,
if Xj+1 >
√
δαj , we gain an additional δ, because then
min
{
2Xj+1
αj
, 1 + δ
}
≥ 1−
(
1−min
{
Xj+1
αj
, 1
})2
+ δ = 1− (1− φαj (Xj+1))2 + δ
(with equality for Xj+1 =
√
δαj and Xj+1 ≥ αj ; the best way to verify this is to ponder the graph in
Figure 4). Therefore,
1
1 + δ
√
δαj
1+δ
2 αj
αj
x
αj
1− (1 − xαj )2
2x
αj
x
Figure 4: Comparison of the 3 relevant functions for Case 1: Note that for x ≥ √δαj , the top two functions
differ by at least δ; i.e, min{ 2xαj , 1 + δ} ≥ 1− (1 −min{ xαj , 1})2 + δ.
ξj+1 =
1
1 + δ
E
[
min
{
2Xj+1
αj
, 1 + δ
}]
≥ 1
1 + δ
E[1− (1− φαj (Xj+1))2] +
δ
1 + δ
Pr[Xj+1 >
√
δαj ].
Using (11) and Pr[Xj+1 >
√
δαj ] > 2δξj , we get
ξj+1 ≥ 1− 2ǫ
1 + δ
ξj +
2δ2
1 + δ
ξj =
1+ 2δ2 − 2ǫ
1 + δ
ξj .
Since αj+1 =
1+δ
2 αj , we get
αj+1ξ
1+δ
j+1 ≥
1 + δ
2
αj
(
1 + 2δ2 − 2ǫ
1 + δ
)1+δ
ξ1+δj =
(1 + 2δ2 − 2ǫ)1+δ
2(1 + δ)δ
αjξ
1+δ
j .
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We choose ǫ = δ4, so that (1 + 2δ2 − 2ǫ)1+δ = (1 + 2δ2 − 2δ4)1+δ ≥ 1 + 2δ2 + δ4 (it can be verified that this
holds for δ ∈ [0, 12 ]). We also use (1 + δ)δ ≤ 1 + δ2 (which holds for δ ∈ [0, 1]). This implies the inductive
statement:
αj+1ξ
1+δ
j+1 ≥
1 + 2δ2 + δ4
2(1 + δ2)
αjξ
1+δ
j =
1 + δ2
2
αjξ
1+δ
j .
Case 2: Pr[
Xj+1
αj
>
√
δ] ≤ 2δξj .
In this case, Xj+1 is almost always very small compared to αj . Then we can gain by making αj+1 much
smaller than αj ; we let αj+1 =
√
δαj . We have
ξj+1 = E[φαj+1 (Xj+1)] = E
[
min
{
Xj+1
αj
√
δ
, 1
}]
=
1√
δ
E
[
min
{
Xj+1
αj
,
√
δ
}]
≥ 1√
δ
(
E
[
min
{
Xj+1
αj
, 1
}]
− (1−
√
δ) Pr
[
Xj+1
αj
>
√
δ
])
≥ 1√
δ
(
E[φαj (Xj+1)]− (1−
√
δ) · 2δξj
)
An elementary bound together with (11) gives
E[φαj (Xj+1)] ≥
1
2
E[1− (1 − φαj (Xj+1))2] ≥
1
2
(1 − 2ǫ)ξj .
Therefore, using our choice of ǫ = δ4,
ξj+1 = E[φαj+1 (Xj+1)] ≥
1√
δ
(
1
2
(1 − 2ǫ)ξj − 2(1−
√
δ)δξj
)
=
1− 2δ4 − 4δ + 4δ3/2
2
√
δ
ξj ≥ 1− 4δ + 2δ
3/2
2
√
δ
ξj .
From here, using αj+1 =
√
δαj and (1− 4δ + 2δ3/2)1+δ ≥ 1− 4δ (which holds for any δ ∈ [0, 14 ]),
αj+1ξ
1+δ
j+1 ≥
√
δαj
(
1− 4δ + 2δ3/2
2
√
δ
)1+δ
ξ1+δj ≥
1− 4δ
21+δδδ/2
αjξ
1+δ
j .
We choose δ = e−10 so that δδ/2 = e−5δ. Then,
αj+1ξ
1+δ
j+1 ≥
1− 4δ
21+δ
e5δαjξ
1+δ
j ≥
1 + δ2
2
αjξ
1+δ
j
which finishes the inductive step.
Putting together Lemma B.6 and the cardinality bound which applies to every feasible solution, we
complete our hardness result for combinatorial public projects.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let ǫ > 0 and δ > 0 be the constants provided by Lemma B.6. Let n = 2ℓ and
m = 400ℓ. Suppose there is a mechanism for the problem max{f(S) : |S| ≤ m/n} that maximizes (1 − ǫ)-
approximately over a distributional range R and provides a c-approximation, where c ≥ 1/n. By Lemma B.5
and Lemma B.3, there are collections of random variables X0,X1, . . . ,Xℓ constructible at the respective levels
by R, satisfying the conditions of Lemma B.6. Hence, by Lemma B.6 for j = ℓ, there is Xℓ constructible by
R at level ℓ such that
αℓ(E[φαℓ(Xℓ)])
1+δ ≥ c1+δ
(
1 + δ2
2
)ℓ
=
c1+δ
n
(1 + δ2)ℓ.
Recall that φαℓ(t) = min{ tαℓ , 1}. Therefore, we have
c1+δ
n
(1 + δ2)ℓ ≤ αℓ(E[φαℓ(Xℓ)])1+δ ≤ αℓE[φαℓ(Xℓ)] ≤ E[Xℓ].
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We have Xℓ =
|R|
|M| where R is a random set sampled according to some distribution in the range R. All
distributions in the range must be feasible in expectation, otherwise the mechanism cannot possibly maximize
over them and return a feasible solution. Therefore, E[Xℓ] ≤ 1n which implies that
c ≤ (1 + δ2)− ℓ1+δ < 2−δ2ℓ = n−δ2 .
Therefore, there is no (1 − ǫ)-approximately MIDR mechanism providing an n−δ2-approximation in the
objective function. Also, we have m = 400ℓ = poly(n), so the approximation cannot be better than m−γ for
some constant γ > 0. The only bound we have used on the mechanism was that the number of value queries
is polynomial in n, or equivalently polynomial in m.
C Proof of hardness for combinatorial auctions
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 5.1.
C.1 The basic random instance
We choose a parameter ℓ ≥ 1 and construct instances with |N | = n = 2ℓ players and |M | = m = 400ℓ items.
We define ”polar valuations” as in [9].
Definition C.1. Given a set of items A ⊂ M and a parameter ω > 0, the polar valuation v∗A associated
with A is defined by
v∗A(S) = |A ∩ S|+ ω|S \A|.
Our ”basic instance” is an instance where each player has a polar valuation associated with a random
set of size m/n.
Definition C.2. In the basic instance, player i has valuation v∗i = v
∗
A
(0)
i
where A
(0)
i is a uniformly random
set of size m/n, chosen independently for each player.
Next, we prove that for some player, his allocation overlaps significantly with his desired set.
Lemma C.3. For any c-approximation mechanism applied to the random basic instance, there is a player
i and sets A
(0)
j , j 6= i, such that conditioned on the desired sets for players j 6= i being A(0)j , player i gets
allocated a random set R
(0)
i such that
E[|R(0)i ∩ A(0)i |] > (c/4− ω)E[|R(0)i ∪ A(0)i |].
Proof. First, let us estimate the optimal social welfare that the basic instance admits in expectation. Given
(A
(0)
1 , . . . , A
(0)
n ), each item in
⋃n
i=1 A
(0)
i can be allocated to some player so that it brings value 1. We ignore
the remaining items. Observe that a fixed item j appears in each A
(0)
i independently with probability 1/n,
therefore Pr[j ∈ ⋃ni=1A(0)i ] = 1− (1− 1/n)n ≥ 1− 1/e > 1/2. Hence,
E[OPT ] ≥ E[|
n⋃
i=1
A
(0)
i |] >
m
2
.
We remind the reader that the expectation is over the random choices of (A
(0)
1 , . . . , A
(0)
n ). A c-approximate
mechanism should provide at least c · OPT in expectation for every particular instance. Hence also in
expectation over the random choice of (A
(0)
1 , . . . , A
(0)
n ). If (R1, . . . , Rn) is the allocation provided by the
mechanism, this means
n∑
i=1
E[|Ri ∩ A(0)i |+ ω|Ri \A(0)i |] ≥ c · OPT >
cm
2
.
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Since each of A
(0)
1 , . . . , A
(0)
n has size m/n and the sizes of R1, . . . , Rn add up to at most m, we can write
n∑
i=1
E[|Ri ∩ A(0)i |+ ω|Ri \A(0)i |] >
cm
2
≥ c
4
n∑
i=1
E[|Ri|+ |A(0)i |] ≥
c
4
n∑
i=1
E[|Ri ∪ A(0)i |].
By an averaging argument, there must be i such that
E[|Ri ∩ A(0)i |+ ω|Ri \A(0)i |] >
c
4
E[|Ri ∪ A(0)i |]
and therefore
E[|Ri ∩ A(0)i |] > (c/4− ω)E[|Ri ∪A(0)i |].
This holds in expectation over the choices of (A
(0)
j : j 6= i), and again by an averaging argument it also holds
conditioned on some particular choice of (A
(0)
j : j 6= i). We call the random set allocated to player i under
this conditioning R
(0)
i .
C.2 Setup for higher-level valuations
In the following, the valuations of all players except i are fixed to be v∗j = v
∗
A
(0)
j
for some choice of sets
(A
(0)
j : j 6= i). Now we will vary the valuation of player i in order to be able to apply the symmetry gap
argument as before. Since we work only with player i, we call him the ”special player” and we drop the
index i in the following.
Recall Definition B.1, the definition of a random bisection sequence. We will use the same concept here,
where at level j we have a random set A(j) partitioned randomly into A(j−1) ∪B(j−1). These sets have sizes
|A(j−1)| = |B(j−1)| = 2j−1−ℓm. We will use valuation functions associated with each pair of sets. We denote
these valuation functions by vA(j−1) ,B(j−1) at level j. In particular, this valuation function depends only on
the elements of A(j) = A(j−1) ∪ B(j−1). In other words, A(j−1) and B(j−1) are the desired sets of items at
level j.
Distribution menu. For each particular choice of a valuation function vA(j),B(j) at a certain level, the
mechanism needs to produce a distribution over item sets for the special player, along with a certain price.
Recall that due to the definition of (approximate) truthfulness in expectation, this choice should give (ap-
proximately) the optimal utility for the special player among all possible choices given the other valuations
v∗−i. After fixing a set of valuation functions vA(j),B(j) for each pair (A
(j), B(j)), the output distribution will
depend only on (A(j), B(j)) and hence we denote the respective random set by R(A(j), B(j)); we also denote
the associated price by P (A(j), B(j)). Thus the mechanisms assigns distributions over sets and prices to all
pairs of sets. As before, we distill the important information from the distribution into a random variable
Xj . There is some additional information now expressed by the price; we associate the price with a separate
random variable Pj . The possible choices of distributions for (Xj , Pj) are what we call a distribution menu
at level j.
Definition C.4. Given a mechanism and a special player with other valuations fixed, the ”distribution menu
at level j”, Mj, is the set of all probability distributions of a pair of variables (Xj , Pj) that arise as follows:
There exist valuations vA(j−1),B(j−1) such that when declaring vA(j−1) ,B(j−1) , the special player receives a
random set R(A(j−1), B(j−1)) at a price P (A(j−1), B(j−1)). Then, for A(j) = A(j−1) ∪B(j−1) chosen as the
(j − 1)-th level of a random bisection sequence, i.e. a random pair of disjoint sets of size 2j−1−ℓm, we have
Xj =
|A(j) ∩R(A(j−1), B(j−1))|
|A(j)| ,
Pj = P (A
(j−1), B(j−1)).
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In other words, Xj encodes the (random) fraction of the relevant items that the special player receives at
level j, and Pj is the respective (random) price. Note that there are two sources of randomness in (Xj , Pj):
one is the random choice of (A(j−1), B(j−1)), and one arises from the randomness of the mechanism for fixed
(A(j−1), B(j−1)).
Closure of a distribution menu. Furthermore, it will be convenient to make the menu closed and convex
as follows.
Definition C.5. We define Mj, the closure of the distribution menu at level j, to be the topological closure
of the set of all convex combinations of distributions from the menu Mj.
I.e., we take the convex hull of the menu and then its topological closure. We emphasize that the convex
hull is generated by averaging distributions, and not the values of (Xj , Pj). In other words, a distribution
of (X ′j , P
′
j) is in Mj if its distribution can be approximated arbitrarily closely by some convex combination
of distributions in Mj . It is important that we keep all the randomness present in (Xj , Pj) and do not take
expectations until the end.
C.3 Symmetry gap revisited
Recall Lemma B.4 which was proved using the symmetry gap argument and played an important role in our
proof for the CPP problem. We still want to use this lemma; however, the difference now is the presence of
prices. In order to deal with prices, we need to introduce a parameter λ which acts as a conversion factor
between values and prices. For that purpose, we prove the following slight variation of Lemma B.4.
Lemma C.6. Let φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be a non-decreasing concave function and λ ≥ 0 any constant. Let A(j+1)
be a fixed set of size 2j+1−ℓm ≥ m/n and (A(j), B(j)) a random partition of A(j+1) into two sets of equal
size. Then there is a monotone submodular function v˜A(j),B(j) for each partition (A
(j), B(j)) such that
• For any distribution of a random set R(j) (possibly correlated with A(j)) and the associated random
variable Xj =
|R(j)∩A(j)|
|A(j)|
, we have
E[v˜A(j) ,B(j)(R
(j))] ≥ λE[φ(Xj − nm−1/2)].
• Any mechanism that uses poly(n) value queries, when applied to the random input v˜A(j) ,B(j) will return
a random set R(j+1) such that for the random variable Xj+1 =
|R(j+1)∩A(j+1)|
|A(j+1)|
,
E[v˜A(j) ,B(j)(R
(j+1))] ≤ λE[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2 + e−Ω(n)].
The expectations are over both (A(j), B(j)) and R(j) or R(j+1) respectively.
Proof. The proof is easily obtained from the proof of Lemma B.4. The only difference is the scaling by
λ ≥ 0. (For λ = 0 the statement is trivial.) Given φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] and λ ≥ 0, we take the function f˜A(j),B(j)
provided by Lemma B.4 and scale it by λ:
v˜A(j) ,B(j)(S) = λf˜A(j),B(j)(S).
Randomizing over (A(j), B(j)), the same proof shows that any mechanism will return a random setR(j+1) with
high probability balanced with respect to (A(j), B(j)). Hence we obtain the same bounds as in Lemma B.4
with the right-hand side scaled by λ.
Applying the assumption of approximate truthfulness, we obtain the following.
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Lemma C.7. Consider a (1−ǫ)-approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions
with n = 2ℓ players and m = 400ℓ items. Let φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a non-decreasing concave function. If
(Xj , Pj) has a distribution in the closure of the level-j menuMj, then for any λ′, λ′′ ≥ 0 there is (Xj+1, Pj+1)
with a distribution in the closure of the level-(j + 1) menu Mj+1 such that
λ′E[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2]− λ′′E[Pj+1] ≥ λ′E[(1 − ǫ)φ(Xj − 10−ℓ)− 10−ℓ]− λ′′E[Pj ].
Proof. First let us assume that λ′′ > 0 and set λ = λ′/λ′′. If (Xj , Pj) is on the menu Mj , it means that
the mechanism under certain valuations depending on the (random) set A(j) allocates to the special player a
random set R(j) (at some price Pj) such that Xj =
|R(j)∩A(j)|
|A(j)|
. Given φ, by Lemma C.6 there are valuation
functions v˜A(j),B(j) such that
E[v˜A(j),B(j)(R
(j))] ≥ λE[φ(Xj − nm−1/2)]
and on the other hand, the mechanism executed on this random input allocates a random set R(j+1) such
that with Xj+1 =
|R(j+1)∩A(j+1)|
|A(j+1)|
,
E[v˜A(j),B(j)(R
(j+1))] ≤ λE[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2 + e−Ω(n)].
Let us assume that the mechanism allocates this distribution at a price Pj+1. Due to the assumption of
(1 − ǫ)-truthfulness, the utility provided by the mechanism must be approximately maximized for the true
valuation. Hence, we must have
λE[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2 + e−Ω(n)]−E[Pj+1] ≥ (1− ǫ)λE[φ(Xj − nm−1/2)]−E[Pj ]. (12)
Given our parameters m = 400ℓ, n = 2ℓ, we have nm−1/2 = 10−ℓ and e−Ω(n) = e−Ω(2
ℓ) << 10−ℓ, therefore
λE[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2]−E[Pj+1] ≥ λE[(1− ǫ)φ(Xj − 10−ℓ)− 10−ℓ]−E[Pj ].
Since this inequality is preserved under convex combinations and limits of the distributions of (Xj , Pj) and
(Xj+1, Pj+1) (the non-linearity of φ is irrelevant here!), the same holds for the closuresMj ,Mj+1: For any
(Xj , Pj) with a distribution in Mj and λ > 0, there exists (Xj+1, Pj+1) with a distribution in Mj+1 such
that (12) holds. This proves the statement of the lemma when λ′′ > 0.
When λ′′ = 0, the statement claims that given (Xj , Pj) ∈ Mj , there is (Xj+1, Pj+1) ∈ Mj+1, such that
E[1 − (1 − φ(Xj+1))2] ≥ E[(1 − ǫ)φ(Xj − 10−ℓ) − 10−ℓ], without regard to prices. This can be obtained
from the previous discussion as follows. Let us assume that p∗ is an absolute lower bound on the expected
price E[Pj+1]. (If the mechanism possibly pays arbitrarily large amounts on the menu of the special player,
then given a zero valuation it cannot maximize utility over the menu.) Given (Xj , Pj) in Mj, let λ =
10ℓ+1(E[Pj ] − p∗); there must be a pair (Xj+1, Pj+1) in Mj+1 satisfying (12). Using the (still very crude)
estimate e−Ω(n) << 10−ℓ−1, (12) implies
E[1− (1− φ(Xj+1))2] ≥ E[(1− ǫ)φ(Xj − nm−1/2)− e−Ω(n)]− E[Pj ]− p
∗
λ
≥ E[(1− ǫ)φ(Xj − 10−ℓ)− 10−ℓ−1]− 10−ℓ−1
≥ E[(1− ǫ)φ(Xj − 10−ℓ)− 10−ℓ].
C.4 The convex separation argument
Next, we use a geometric argument, essentially Farkas’ lemma in 2 dimensions, which shows that the bounds
for varying multipliers λ′, λ′′ ≥ 0 allow us to obtain separate bounds on value and price.
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Lemma C.8. Consider a (1−ǫ)-approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions
with n = 2ℓ players and m = 400ℓ items. Let φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a non-decreasing concave function.
If (Xj , Pj) has a distribution in the closure of the level-j menu Mj, then there is (Xj+1, Pj+1) with a
distribution in the closure of the level-(j + 1) menu Mj+1 such that
E[Pj+1] ≤ E[Pj ]
and
E[1− (1 − φ(Xj+1))2] ≥ E[(1− ǫ)φ(Xj − 10−ℓ)− 10−ℓ].
(qj , pj)
Qj+1
Figure 5: The convex separation argument.
Proof. Denote qj = E[(1− ǫ)φ(Xj−10−ℓ)−10−ℓ] and qj+1 = E[1− (1−φ(Xj+1))2]. Set also pj = E[Pj ] and
pj+1 = E[Pj+1]. By Lemma C.7, for any (Xj , Pj) ∈ Mj and any λ′, λ′′ ≥ 0, there is (Xj+1, Pj+1) ∈ Mj+1
such that λ′qj+1 − λ′′pj+1 ≥ λ′qj − λ′′pj . Using these transformations, let us map the set Mj to
Qj = {(qj , pj) : (Xj , Pj) ∈Mj}.
and map Mj+1 to
Qj+1 = {(qj+1, pj+1) : (Xj+1, Pj+1) ∈Mj+1}.
Both Qj and Qj+1 are closed convex sets, because they are the images of the closed convex sets Mj,Mj+1
under a linear map (the map being the expectation of a certain function over a distribution; this is linear as
a function of the distribution even though the function is non-linear).
By this transformation, we have reduced the proof to a geometric question in the plane (see Figure 5):
Given (qj , pj), assume that for any λ
′, λ′′ ≥ 0, there is (qj+1, pj+1) ∈ Qj+1 such that λ′qj+1 − λ′′pj+1 ≥
λ′qj − λ′′pj . Is it possible that there is no point (qj+1, pj+1) ∈ Qj+1 such that qj+1 ≥ qj and pj+1 ≤ pj?
27
Suppose that there is no such point in Qj+1. This means that Qj+1 and {(q, p) : q ≥ qj , p ≤ pj} are
disjoint. Since these are closed convex sets, they can be separated by a line. This line cannot have a negative
slope, otherwise it would intersect the quadrant {(q, p) : q ≥ qj , p ≤ pj}. Such a separating line gives
λ′, λ′′ ≥ 0 such that λ′qj+1 − λ′′pj+1 < λ′qj − λ′′pj for all (qj+1, pj+1) ∈ Qj+1. However, this contradicts
the assumption above. Hence there is a point (qj+1, pj+1) ∈ Qj+1 such that qj+1 ≥ qj and pj+1 ≤ pj .
C.5 Putting it all together
In this section, we finish the proof of our main hardness result for combinatorial auctions.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let ǫ > 0 and δ > 0 be the constants provided by Lemma B.6. Let the number of
players be n = 2ℓ and the number of items m = 400ℓ. Suppose there is a (1 − ǫ)-approximately truthful-in-
expectation mechanism that provides a c-approximation in social welfare, where c = 1/nγ = 2−γℓ for some
constant γ > 0.
Consider the basic instance (Section C.1). Choose a special player and fix the remaining valuations,
based on Lemma C.3. Let R(0) be the random set allocated to the special player, P0 the respective price,
A(0) his desired set, X0 =
|R(0)∩A(0)|
|A(0)|
, c0 = E[X0] and p0 = E[P0]. Lemma C.3 implies c0 ≥ c/4− ω. We set
ω = c/8. Then c0 ≥ c/8 = 1/(8nγ) = 2−γℓ−3.
Now consider the distribution menus at different levels and their closures Mj (Section C.2). Let us
define Xj to be the collection of random variables Xj such that (Xj , Pj) is inMj for some price Pj such that
E[Pj ] ≤ p0. As discussed above, we have X0 in X0 such that E[X0] = c0 ≥ 2−γℓ−3 ≥ 2−ℓ for ℓ sufficiently
large. Also, Lemma C.8 says that for any Xj in Xj and any non-decreasing concave φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1], we
have Xj+1 in Xj+1 such that
E[1− (1 − φ(Xj+1))2] ≥ E[(1− ǫ)φ(Xj − 10−ℓ)− 10−ℓ].
In other words, the collections X0,X1, . . . ,Xℓ satisfy the assumptions of Lemma B.6. Hence, by Lemma B.6
for j = ℓ, there is Xℓ in Xℓ and αℓ ∈ [0, 1] such that
αℓ(E[φαℓ(Xℓ)])
1+δ ≥
(
1 + δ2
2
)ℓ
c1+δ0 .
Recall that φαℓ(t) = min{ tαℓ , 1}. Therefore, we have
E[Xℓ] ≥ αℓE[φαℓ(Xℓ)] ≥ αℓ(E[φαℓ(Xℓ)])1+δ ≥
(
1 + δ2
2
)ℓ
c1+δ0 ≥ 2δ
2ℓ−ℓc1+δ0 .
Since Xℓ is in Xℓ, the respective price is bounded by E[Pℓ] ≤ p0. Now consider an expression related to the
utility the special player would derive in the basic instance:
E[(1− ǫ)ωmXℓ − Pℓ] ≥ (1− ǫ)ωm2δ
2ℓ−ℓc1+δ0 − p0.
The distribution of (Xℓ, Pℓ) might not be on the actual menu Mℓ of the special player; however, since it is
in the closure of its convex hull, there exists a pair (X˜ℓ, P˜ℓ) with a distribution in Mℓ such that
E[(1− ǫ)ωmX˜ℓ − P˜ℓ] > (1− 2ǫ)ωm2δ
2ℓ−ℓc1+δ0 − p0.
(If not, we get a contradiction since if the reverse inequality holds for Mℓ, it holds also for the closure M ℓ.)
The random variable X˜ℓ represents a random set R˜
(ℓ), possibly allocated to the special player at price P˜ℓ:
X˜ℓ =
|R˜(ℓ)|
|A(ℓ)|
= 1m |R˜(ℓ)|.
Now let us go back to the basic instance. Considering that the valuation of the special player in the basic
instance satisfies v∗i (S) ≥ ω|S|, we obtain
E[(1 − ǫ)v∗i (R˜(ℓ))− P˜ℓ] ≥ E[(1 − ǫ)ωmX˜ℓ − P˜ℓ] > (1 − 2ǫ)ωm2δ
2ℓ−ℓc1+δ0 − p0.
28
Using c0 ≥ c/8 = ω = 2−γℓ−3, we get
E[(1− ǫ)v∗i (R˜(ℓ))− P˜ℓ] > (1− 2ǫ)
( c
8
)1+δ
2δ
2ℓ−ℓmc0 − p0 = (1− 2ǫ)2δ2ℓ−(1+δ)(γℓ+3)−ℓmc0 − p0. (13)
On the other hand, the set R(0) actually allocated under declared valuation v∗i gives
E[v∗i (R
(0))] = E[|R(0) ∩A(0)|] + ωE[|R(0) \A(0)|] ≤ m
n
E[X0] + ωE[|R(0)|] ≤ 2m
n
E[X0]
using again Lemma C.3 to say that mn E[X0] = E[|R(0) ∩A(0)|] ≥ (c/4−ω)E[|R(0)|] = ωE[|R(0)|]. Therefore,
since E[X0] = c0 and E[P0] = p0,
E[v∗i (R
(0))− P0] ≤ 2m
n
E[X0]−E[P0] = 21−ℓmc0 − p0. (14)
Since R˜(ℓ) is a random set the special player could receive at price P˜ℓ if he had declared a suitable valuation,
(1− ǫ)-approximate truthfulness implies that
E[v∗i (R
(0))− P0] ≥ E[(1 − ǫ)v∗i (R˜(ℓ))− P˜ℓ].
Considering (13) and (14), this implies
21−ℓ > (1− 2ǫ)2δ2ℓ−(1+δ)(γℓ+3)−ℓ.
We conclude that γ ≥ δ21+δ , otherwise we get a contradiction for a large enough ℓ.
D Chernoff bound for bisections
Lemma D.1. Suppose S is a fixed subset of [m′], and (A,B) a random partition of [m′], chosen uniformly
among all partitions where |A| = |B| = m′/2. Then
Pr [||S ∩ A| − |S ∩B|| > βm′]] < 4e−β2m′/2.
Proof. We use the fact that A has distribution very close to a uniformly random subset of [m′] (where
elements appear independently with probability 1/2). More precisely, we couple the two distributions as
follows. Let A be a random set of size m′/2, B its complement, and let X be a binomial random variable
Bi(m′, 1/2). Let R be a random set chosen as follows: if X ≤ m′/2, take a random subset of A of size X .
If X > m′/2, take the union of A and X −m′/2 random elements from B. This defines a set R which is
uniformly random. Hence, by the Chernoff bound (see e.g. [1, Theorem A.1.16]),
Pr[|R∆A| > αm′] = Pr[Bi(m′, 1/2) /∈ [m′/2− αm′,m′/2 + αm′]] < 2e−2α2m′ .
Similarly, S∆R has the distribution of a uniformly random set (because S is fixed), and hence
Pr[|S∆R| /∈ [m′/2− αm′,m′/2 + αm′]] < 2e−2α2m′ .
Using the triangle inequality |S∆A| ≤ |S∆R|+ |R∆A|, we get
Pr[|S∆A| /∈ [m′/2− 2αm′,m′/2 + 2αm′]] < 4e−2α2m′ .
The lemma follows by taking α = β/2, since |S ∩ A| − |S ∩B| = |A| − |S∆A| = m′2 − |S∆A|.
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E Product composition of submodular functions
Lemma E.1. Let f1, f2 : 2
M → [0, 1] be monotone submodular. Then
f(S) = 1− (1− f1(S))(1 − f2(S))
is also monotone submodular.
Proof. Let g1(S) = 1 − f1(S), g2(S) = 1 − f2(S); these are non-negative non-increasing supermodular
functions. Clearly, g(S) = g1(S)g2(S) is also non-increasing. Our goal is to prove that g(S) = g1(S)g2(S) is
supermodular, which implies the claim. By the properties of g1, g2, we get for any i, j /∈ S
g1(S)(g2(S)− g2(S + i)) ≥ g1(S)(g2(S + j)− g2(S + i+ j)) ≥ g1(S + j)(g2(S + j)− g2(S + i+ j))
and
(g1(S)− g1(S + i))g2(S + i) ≥ (g1(S + j)− g1(S + i+ j))g2(S + i) ≥ (g1(S + j)− g1(S + i+ j))g2(S + i+ j).
Adding up these two inequalities, we get the condition of supermodularity for g(S) = g1(S)g2(S):
g1(S)g2(S)− g1(S + i)g2(S + i) ≥ g1(S + j)g2(S + j)− g1(S + i+ j)g2(S + i+ j).
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